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The costs of hyperinflation are almost unbearable to any eco-
nomic system.  Nevertheless, stopping hyperinflation seerns to
be faster and less costly than stabilizing chronic inflation. The
history of stabilization shows that fiscal restraint and adequate
external resources are key elements for successful stabilization.
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Mcocnomic Adjustment
and Growth
A key issue in anti-inflationary policymaking is  eighties) reduced inflation more rapidly than
how to bring inflation down permanently and at  traditional programs, but led to overvalued real
a low cost.  Solimano reviewed several anti-  exchange rates and the accumulation of foreign
inflationary programs to determine the role  debt.  Correcting these disequilibria arising in
played by fiscal reform, the availability of  the course of stabilization proved that those
foreign resources, stabilization of the exchange  exchange rate-based stabilization programns  did
rate, and the distributive conflict in the success  not eliminate but only delayed the costs of
or failure of those programs.  stabilization.
Focusing on the costs of stabilization and  Heterodox stabilization programs signifi-
the lessons to be drawn from each case, Soli-  cantly reduced inflation in the short run, without
mano examined three types of anti-inflationary  recession and even with (moderate) growth-but
experience: stabilization of hyperinflation (in  in Argentina and Brazil the,  gains were tempo-
Germany, 1923; Austria, 1922; and Bolivia,  rary, and inflation accelerated dramatically in
1984-85); orthodox stabilization programs in the  1987, 1988, and 1989. These results are
Southern Cone in the mid-1970s and early  explained by differcnt factors like the difficulties
1980s; and heterodox stabilization programs in  in controlling aggregate demand and the fiscal
Argentina, 1985-87, and Brazil, 1986-87. He  deficit, the behavior of relative prices during sta-
concluded that:  bilization, the net transfer abroad, the inertia of
the economy's contract structure,  and the
Stabilization of hyperinilation entails  influence of the distributive conflict and th'
costs-in  terrms  of employment and real  political cycle.  Israel has succeeded with -
wages-but  they seem to be lower than the costs  heterodox program, stabilizing inflation more
of stabilizing chronic-intermediate inflation,  permanently by undertaking fiscal adjustment
mainly through restrictive demand policies.  and benefiting from a net resource transferfrom
abroad.
The orthodox experiences in the Southern
Cone in the mid-1970s show that stabilization  The intertemporal distribution of the costs of
programs that focus only on restrictive monetary  stabilization that tilt toward the end of the
and fiscal policy can be slow in producing anti-  program of stabilization is a feature valid both in
inflationary results and may cost considerably in  programs that rely on one nominal anchor and in
terms of activity levels and real wages.  Ortho-  heterodox plans that use several nominal an-
dox programs based on exchange rate manage-  chors to stabilize.
ment (tried in the late seventies and early
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The  macroeconomic  effects  and  the  actual  costs  of  different  anti-
inflationary  programs  is  a subject  of great  importance  for  the  design  of
stabilization  policies. In effect,  how  to  bring  inflation  down  on a  permanent
basis  and  at a low  economic  cost  is  at the  core  of the  discussion  on the
conceptual  foundations  and  actual  results  of  different  anti-inflationary
policies.
This  paper  reviews  several  historical  anti-inflationary  proframs  and
some  of  the  recent  past.  The  purpose  of  the  paper  is  to  help  understand
current  difficulties  with 'tabilization,  especially  in  Latin  America. The
emphasis  in  each  experience  reviewed  is  on the  cost  of stabilization  and  the
role  played  by fiscal  reform,  the  availability  of foreign  resources,  the
stabilization  of the  exchange  rate  and  the  distributive  conflict,  relating  to
the  success  or failure  of the  particular  anti-inflationary  program  studied.
In  addition,  special  attention  is  given  to the  existing  controversies  on the
causes  and  cures  of inflation  in the  literature  on stabilization.
The  paper  is  organized  into  four  sections  besides  this  introduction.  In
Section  B, three  hyperinflations  are  analyzed: Germany  in  1923,  Austria  in
1922  and  Bolivia  in 1984-85;  emphasizing  the  origin  of the  hyperinflation
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and  the  results  of the  stabilization  plans  implemented  in  each  of these
economies. In Section  C, the  analysis  centers  on the  orthodox  stabilization
programs  applied  to the  Southern  Cone  of  Latin  America  during  the  mid-
seventies  to early  eighties. We study  the  traditional  monetarist  plans  as
well as the  open  economy  version  applied  in  Chile,  Uruguay  and  Argentina
during  that  period. Their  effectiveness  in reducing  inflation  and  their
impact  on employment,  real  wages  and  on income  distribution  is  discussed.
Section  D examines  the  heterodox  stabilization  plans  applied  in  Latin  America.
For  that  purpose  we considered  the  Austral  Plan  of  Argentina  and  the  Cruzado
Plan  of  Brazil,  with some  reference  to  the  Israeli  case. Section  E
synthesizes  and  discusses  the  lessons  and  questions  that  arise  from  the
stabilization  experiences  reviewed  in this  paper. Finally,  Appendix  I
presents  a formalization  ot the  balance  of payments  view  of inflation  that  was
popular  in the  twenties.This  approach,  in  turn,  may  be illuminating  in
understanding  other  episodes  of inflationary  acceleration,  mainly  in  Latin
America  in the  eighties.
B.  Hyperinflations  and  stabilization:
Germany  1923.  Austria  1922  and
Bolivia  1985
Hyperinflations  are  periods  of extremely  large  and  frequent  increases  in
the  price  level,  which  lead  to severe  dislocations  in the  functioning  of the
economic  system. Defining  hyperinflation  is certainly  a  matter  of  convention.
The  best  known  definition  is  Cagan's  (1956)  which  assumes  that  a  hyper-
inflation  starts  when the  monthly  rates  of inflation  are  greater  than  50
percent  and  that  it ends  when inflation  is  less  than  50 percent  in  every  month3
during  at least  one  year. 1
1.  European  Hyperinflations:
Germany  (1923),  Austria  (1922)
Germany,  1923: The  Europesn  hyperinflations  of the  twenties  were,
borrowing  Keynes  (1919)  famous  dictum,  to  a great  extent  the  "economic
consequences  of the  peace  that  followed  World  War  I.  In  effect,  the  war
reparation  payments  sanctioned  by the  Treaty  of  Versailles  on  Germany  and  on
the  ex  Austro-Hungarian  empire  (already  separated  into  independent  countries).
produced  at least  two  adverse  economic  effects. On the  one  hand,  they  imposed
a  heavy  burden  on the  balance  of payments  of these  economies.  Germany,  for
example,  had to transfer  nearly  sit  percent  of her  income  abroad,  although
this  effect  was in  part  ameliorated  by an inflow  of foreign  capital. The
scarcity  of foreign  exchange,  in turn,  led  to  devaluations  followed  by
monetary  accommodation  and  domestic  inflation.  On the  other  hand,  the  war
reparation  payments  and,  in  the  German  case,  the  takeover  of the  Ruhr  province
and  the  passive  resistance  policy  financed  by the  government  led  to a strong
deterioration  of the  fiscal  budget,  which  wase  financed  through  loans  from  the
Central  Bank  to the  National  Treasury.
The  combined  effect  of these  shocks  and  domestic  policies  produced
extreme  macroeconomic  instability,  as seen  in  columns  (1)  to (3)  of Table  1.
In fact,  Germany  (1922)  registered  a yearly  rate  of inflation  of  nearly  4,000
percent,  while  the  exchange  rate  was devalued  by  more  than  5,000  percent.
Nearly  40 percent  of the  fiscal  expenditures  were financed  by  money  creation.
In 1923,  the  situation  became  even  worse,  especially  after  the  unsuccessful
stabilization  attempt  of February  to  April  of that  year;  so that  by  August4
inflation  exceeded  7,500  percent  monthly  and  in  October  it reached  30,000
percent.
In  Germany,  all  of the  characteristic  elements  of a  hyperinflation  were
present: (a)  a  complete  domestic  demonetization  and  a shift  of pvrtfolios
towards  foreign  currency;  (b)  an increase  in  the  fiscal  deficit,  mostly
because  of the  decreased  real  tax  revenue  du.  to the  fiscal  lag.
Additionally,  the  growing  fiscal  deficit  in,  eased  the  rate  of domestic  credit
expansion  fueling  inflation,  thus  generating  an unstable  inflationary  process
lc)  the lend'  of the  contract  structure,  in terms  of  a drastic  shortening  of
its  durations  (de  facto)  pegging  them  to the  exchange  rate;  (d)  a  very rapid
depreciation  of the  exchange  rate;and  (e)  a  decrease  in the  indexes  of
physical  production,  real  wages  and  an increase  in  unemployment.
Under  these  conditions,  the  need for  stabilization  was  clear. It  was
finally  achieved  in  early  November  1923  and  was even  followed  by a  price
deflation  at the  beginning  of 1924. The  three  basic  elements  of the
stabilization  were:2
i)  A  fiscal  reform,  which  included  an increase  in taxes  and  a
reduction  in  public  expenditures;
ii)  A monetary  reform  forbidding  the  Reichsbank  to discount  government
bonds  as an (inflationary)  form  of financing  the  deficit;
iii)  Depreciation  of  the  Rentenmark  and  afterwards  freezing  the
exchange  rate.
It is  interesting  that  the  stabilization  program  took  place  along  with
the  arrangement  of  an external  loan,  granted  under  the  supervision  of the
League  of  Nations,  which  was  finally  received  by  Germany  in  1924.  The  loan
was  conditional  upon the  implementation  of legislative  reforms  in the  fiscal5
and  monetary  areas.
With  regard  to the  impact  of the  stabilization  on production,  real  wages
and  employment,  the  available  information  (Table  2) shows  that  the index  of
per  capita  production  falls  substantially  in the  year  of the  hyperinflation  -
1923 --  and rises  quickly  in  1924,  the  year  of price  stability.  Real  wages
rise  when  the inflation  rate  falls. This  is  made  apparent  by comparing
December  1923  with October  of the  same  year.  In 1924  real  wages  rise  again.
Table  2 also  shows  that  unemployment  rates  increased  at the  beginning  of the
stabilization  and  tended  to  decrease  in 1924.
Austria  1922. The  hyperinflationazy  process  in  Austria  (the  country
which  suffered  losses  of territory  and  of  assets  due  to the  disintegration  of
the  Austro-Hungarian  empire)  started  in late  1921,  and lasted  until  September
of 1922.  In that  month,  a stabilization  plan  was carried  out,  which  consisted
of restrictive  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  and  stabilization  of the  exchange
rate  supported  with foreign  loans.
The  Austrian  plan included  real  tax  increases,  reduction  of fiscal
expenditures  and  an  inhibiting  legislation  on  loans  from  the  Natlonal  Bank  of
Austria  to the  government.  In addition,  the  importance  of foreign  financing
in  the  stabilization  process  - through  a loan  received  from  the  League  of
Nations  - was  decisive. In fact,  it contributed  to stabilizing  the  exchange
rate  (which  was  floating),  an  essential  ingredient  in  stopping  price
increases.
Referring  to  the  costs  of  Austrian  stabilization,  Wicker  (1986)  reports
significant  losses  of employment.  Until  1926,  the  number  of  people  who lost
their  jobs  in the  financial  sector,  (which  became  smaller  during  the6
stabilization),  was 10,000. Similarly,  there  was  a reduction  of 85,0oo  in
public mployment. In fact,  it is  quite  possible  that  Austria  could  no longer
support  the  bureaucracy  left  over  from  the  defunct  Austro-Hungarian  empire.
All  of this  suggests  that  the  fall  in  employment  associated  with the
stabilization  process  was  not  negligible,  at least  in absolute  terms.
2.  The  Bolivian  Case,  1984-85
The  Bolivian  case  of 1984-85  is  one  of the  most recent  episodes  of
hyperinflation  (another  is Nicaragua  in 1988). As in  the  European  experiences
of the  twenties,  this  hyperinflation  originated  in difficulties  in the
external  sector,  deterioration  of  he public  finances  and  social  and  political
conflicts. 3
The  process  of  accelerating  price  increases  in Bolivia  illustrates  the
common  pattern  of  hyperinflations  (Table  3):  Very  high  monthly  inflation  rates
(over  50  percent  per  month  between  April  of 1984  and  September  of 1985).
Drastic  decreases  in real  money  balances,  even  in  the  presence  of rapid
expansion  of the  nominal  quantity  of  money  (indicating  an increase  in  money-
velocity);  Domestic  dollarization,  shortening  of contracts  and  pegging  to the
dollar,  especially  the  parallel  exchange  rate;  and  increases  in the  fiscal
deficit,  due  to  the  erosion  of the  real  value  of tax  revenue.
In the  Bolivian  stabilization  plan,  carried-out  by the  government  of
PaL-Estenssoro  in  August  1985,  the  stabilization  of the  exchange  rate  led  to  a
sudden  stop  of inflation  (as  in the  stabilization  episodes  in  Germany  and
Austria  in  the  208). This is  explained  by the  fact  that  wages,  the  prices  of
domestic  and imported  inputs,  and  most  contracts  were  de facto  pegged  to  the
exchange  rate.  So,  when this  key  price  was stabilized,  the  rate  of increase7
in  prices  also  stopped. 4
The Bolivian  Plan  also  comprised  a drastic  fiscal  reform 5, an  agreement
with the  IMP  and  a  continued  moratorium  on the  repayment  of both  principal  and
interest  of the  external  debt.  The  resultb  of the  plan  on inflation  control
were felt  immediate  especially  in  October  and  November  of 1985  (although
inflation  accelerated  again  in  December  of 1985  and  January  of 1986).
However,  during  the  rest  of 1986,  the  stabilization  was completely
consolidated.
An interesting  feature  of the  Bolivian  stabilization  program  was the
slow  remonetization  of the  economy,  made  apparent  through  low  real  balances
(Table  3, column  3),  which  indicate  that  restoring  confidence  and  credibility
was a slow  process. Referring  to the  behavior  of real  wages,  the  available
evidence  (column  5 and  6 of Table  3) shows  that  they  fell  dtastically  in the
second  quarter  of 1985  and st.tsed  to recover  when inflation  slowed  down.
The (measured)  GDP fell  in 1985  and  in 1986  (it  had  been  decreasing
since  the  early  80s),  due  partly  to the  stabilization  plan  and  also  to  the
deterioration  of the  terms  of trade  in  those  years. Furthermore,  open
unemployment  in  Bolivia  has  been  considerable  - nearly  20  percent  (1986).
Morales,  (1987),  attributes  three  points  of this  percentage  to the
stabilization  policy. The  reduction  of employment  in  the  public  sector  and
the  negativ*  growth  in  1985-86  would  explain  the  increase  in  open
unemployment.8
C.  Orthodox  Stabilization  ProRrams:
The  Southern  Cone  in  the  mid 70s
and  early  80s
Orthodox  (or  monetarist)  stabilization  programs  usually  refer  to anti-
inflationary  policies  that  seek  to reduce  (or  eliminate)  the rate  of increase
in  the  price  level  mainly  through  reductions  in the  rate  of growth  of  money.
Accordingly,  they  must reduc.  the  fiscal  deficit,  which  would  be the  ultimate
cause  of the  money  creation  and  inflation. 6 The  prior  question  about  what
produces  the fiscal  deficit,  is left  unanswered.
The 'initial  conditions'  of the  stabilization  in  Argentina,  Chile  and
Uruguay  in  the  mid-seventies  consisted  of severe  disequilibria.  In  Chile  in
1973.  the  yearly  inflation  rate  reached  813  percent  and  the  fiscal  deficit  was
almost  25  percent  of GDP. Argentina,  in  1976,  had  an inflation  rate  of over
400  percent  and  the  fiscal  deficit  reached  7.2  percent  of GDP.  In  Uruguay,
1974,  the  inflation  rate  was lower  but  still  considerable,  77.2  percent.
In  this  connection,  stabilization  in  the  three  economies  included
reductions  of the  fiscal  deficit,  significant  initial  devaluations  (followsd
by some  system  of periodic  exchange  rate  readjustments  or crawling  pegs)  and
wage  controls  mainly  engineered  through  de-indexation  (see  "Phase  Is in  Table
4).
However,  the  reductLon  in inflation  was  not  spectacular  in  the  short  and
medium  run.  In  Chile,  in  1976,  although  inflation  was one  third  of that  of
1973,  it  was  still  over  200  percent  yearly,  even  though  the  fiscal  deficit  was
drastically  reduced  (from  24.7  percent  of the  GDP  in 1973  to 2.3  percent  in
1976). In  Argentina,  in 1978,  Inflation  continued  to  be over  150  percent
yearly  and in  Uruguay,  nearly  45 percent,  although  these  economies  had  also
performed  significant  fiscal  adjustments. 79
Concerning  the  costs  of these  orthodox  plans  (Table  5),  we observe  that
Chile  and  Uruguay  suffered  a shurp  drop  in real  wages,  near 18  percent  in  both
countries  (between  1973  and  1976  in  Chile  and  between  1974  and  1978  in
Uruguay). 8 The  cut  in real  wages  in  Argentina  was smaller  (2.5  percent
between  1976  and  1978),  although  this  value  would  have  been  greater  if 1975
were  considered  as the  reference  point.
On the  other  hand,  the  rate  of  unemployment  in  Chile  jumped  from  4.6
percent  in 1973  to  19.4  percent  in 1976. In  Uruguay  unemployment  also  rose  by
about  two  percentage  points. But  in  Argentina,  surprisingly  enough,  there  was
a  reduction  in  unemployment  between  1976  and  1978.
The  record  on income  distribution  under  orthodox  stabilization  in  Chile,
Argentina  and  Uruguay  (Table  6) shows  a significant  reduction  of the  share  of
labor  in  national  income  during  the  first  rphase  of the  stabilization  plan,
1973-1978. This  process  was followed  by a recovery  of the  labor's  share  in
the  early  eighties,  although  not to  the  point  of  what it  had  in 19709
Let  us now  turn  to  the  open-economy  monetarism,  or exchange  rate  based
stabilization  plans  carried  out  in the  South2rn  Cone  at the  end  of the
seventies  and  early  eighties  (Phase  II in  Table  4).
The specific  details  of these  programs  were  different  in  the  three
economies  considered. In  Chile  the  exchange  -ate  was fixed  from  June  1979  to
June  1982. A  system  of  pro-announced  exchange  rate  devaluations  at decreasing
rates  throughout  time  was  used in  Argentina  until  1981  and  in  Uruguay  until
late  1982.
In Chile  and  Argentina,  inflation  decreased,  real  wages  increased  (or
recovered)  and  the  unemployment  rate  fell;  additionally,  in  all  three10
countries  GDP  growth  accelerated,  but  unsustainable  disequilibrium  developed
in the  balance  of payments.
The  size  of the  disequilibrium  accumulated  in  the  external  sector  may  be
appreciated  by looking  at the  real  exchange  rate. In fact,  the  real  exchange
rate  measured  in  wage units  appreciated  more than  50  percent  in  Chile  between
1976  and  1981,  and  by a similar  percentage  in  Argentina  between  1978  and  1980
(Table  5).  The  overvaluation  in  Uruguay  was  about  20  percent  in  Phase  II.  In
turn,  th3  financial  system  expezienced  an enormous  increase  in its  liabilities
which  were  backed  by assets  of dubious  quality. These  developments  finally
led  to  Very severe  financial  crisis  in these  economies  (Diaz-Alejandro,  1985).
As an example,  in Chile  as late  as 1987,  the  Central  Bank  held  a stock  of non-
performing  loans  of the  financial  system  that  amounted  to 262  of its  total
assets  (Arellano,  1988).
The  phenomenon  of exchange  rate  overvaluation  showed  the  sluggishness  of
domestic  inflation  in  converging  to international  inflation  (plus  the  rate  of
devaluation),  as  had  been  predicted  by the  Monetary  Approach  to the  Balance  of
Payments  popular  at that  time.  In fact,  the  observed  price  behavior  made
evident  thst  the  law  of one  price  holds  just  mildly  in  the  aggregate. Among
the  factors  that  conspired  against  meeting  the  targets  on inflation  were  in
Chile,  an  excessive  level  of domestic  spending  on  non-tradable  goods  combined
with  clausee  of 100  percent  backward  wage indexation  in a context  of
decreasing  inflation. In  Argentina,  contrasting  with  the  Chilean  case,  a
large  fiscal  deficit  was one  of the  main causes  of failing  to  meet the  anti-
inflationary  targets. In  addition  to this,  the  appreciation  of the  real
exchange  rate  was  an important  factor  affecting  foreign  debt  accumulation  in
Chile,  Argentina  and  Uruguay.11
The  combinatic-  of excessive  foreign  debt  accumulation  and  negative
foreign  shocks  in  the  early  eighties  led  the  governments  of the  Southern  Cone
to abandon  their  exchange  rate-basad  stabilizati"n  plans. They  finally
devalued  andlor  gave  up  with the  tablita  (system  of preannounced  devaluations
at a decreasing  pace)  while  adopting  policies  to reduce  domestic  absorption
and  prevent  a large-scale  financial  collapse. The  final  outcome  was an
acceleration  in inflation  - of  different  magnitudes  in  the  three  economies  -
and  a devastating  impact  on activity  levels,  unemployment  and  real  wages (see
Table  5).
D.  Heterodox  stabilization  programs  in  Latin  America: The  exDeriences  of
ArRentina  1985-87  and  Brazil  1986-87
During  the  past three  years,  Argentina  and  Brazil  implemented  heterodox
stabilization  plans.  (Israel,  in  mid  1985,  and  Mexico,  in  December  187, also
adopted  heterodox  programs). These  plans  were launched  in  a context  of
accelerating  inflation  rates  approaching  a  hyperinflationary  situation.
The  central  innovation  of these  stabilization  programs  was the  use  of
generalized  controls  over  prices,  wages,  public  tariffs  and  the  exchange  rate.
This  was the  response  to  both  a diagnosis  of inertial  inflation  and  to the
desire  of  avoiding  the  recessionary  and  distributive  costs  often  associated  to
orthodox  stabilization  programs.
The  basic  elements  of the  Argentine  stabilization  plan  of June  198510
are  well-known  and featured  the  freezing  of  wages,  the  exchange  rate  and
tariffs  for  an unspecified  length  of time. Previous  to this,  the  exchange
rate,  public  sector  tariffs  and  other  prices  were adjusted  in  order  to begin
the  program  with corrected  relative  prices  and  a better  fiscal  budget.12
Additionally,  after  creating-the  new  currency,  the  Austral,  a scale  was
adopted  to convert  contracts  for  wages  and  debts  and  avoid  undesired
distributive  effects  associated  with  the  sharp  decline  in  inflation. Finally,
the  program  was accepted  by the  IMF  and  Argentina  received  additional  foreign
financing,  with active  participation  of the  American  goverDment.
During  the  first  nlne  months  of its  application,  the  plan  was  quite
successful.  In  fact,  inflation  fell  from  a  monthly  average  of 26  percent
between  January  and  June  of 1985  to an  average  of 3  percent  between  July  1985
and  March  1986. After  the *price  flexibilization,  step  that  took  place  in
April  1986,  inflation  began  to  rise  again,  reaching  a  monthly  average  between
April  and  December  1986  of 5.8  percent. Inflation  accelerated  furthe-  in
1987,  with  a  178  percent  increase  in the  consumer  price  index. The  situation
became  even  worse in  1988  when inflation  rose  to  around  400  percent,  on a
year-to-year  basis.
Referring  to  the  economic  costs  of the  Argentine  stabilization  plan,  the
purchasing  power  of (industrial)  wages  fell  by about  12  percent  between  May  of
1985 (the  month  preceding  the  appearance  of the  Austral)  and  November  of 1988.
Nevertheless,  until  June  of 1987,  the  purchasing  power  of industrial  wages  had
increased  by 7.2  percent. It  was  basically  the  more  rapid  acceleration  of
inflation  beginning  in  the  second  half  of 1987  that  depressed  real  wages. In
relation  to activity  levels,  the  plan  was  moderately  expansives on average,
industrial  output  increased  by 3.4  percent  during  the  years  1986-87. This  is
consistent  with the  heterodox  idea  of avoiding  a recessionary  outcome.
However  the  resumption  in inflation  casts  doubts  whether  a permanent  reduction
in inflation  can  be achieved  at low  cost.  This  is  a very  important  subject
and  requires  more investigation.  To  conclude  this  discussion  over  heterodox13
plans  in  Latin  America,  let  us now  examine  the  Brazilian  experience  with the
Cruzado  Plan  in 1986  and  its  outcome.
The  Cruzado  Plan,  like  the  Austral  Plan  consisted  of a general  freeze  of
prices,  wages,  the  exchange  rate  and  public  tariffs. Wages  were initially
converted  to their  average  level  of the  preceding  semester  and  then  increased
by eight  percent  across  the  board,  plus  a 15Z  bonus  applied  to the  minimum
wage.  Unlike  the  Austral,  however,  the  exchange  rate  and  public  tariffs  were
not  adjusted  before  the  freeze. In addition,  indexation  was removed  and  wages
were  automatically  adjusted  if  the  accumulated  inflation  exceeded  20 percent
(trigger  system).
The  first  months  of this  plan  were  highly  successful.  Monthly  inflation
rates  were between  1 and  2 percent,  industrial  output  increased  by 40 percent
between  February  and  October  of 1986;  and in  November  1986,  real  wages  were
nine  percent  greater  than  their  average  level  attained  in 1985.  In  spite  of
that,  the  Plan started  to be  unsustainable  in  August  1986. The  trade  surplus
fell  from  over  one  billion  dollars  per  month  (level  existing  at the  beginning
of the  Cruzado  Plan),  to 544  million  in  September  1986,  turning  negative
between  October  and  December  of that  year. The  deterioration  of the  balance
of payments  was even  more striking  if  we consider  that  Brazil  lost  3.5  billion
dollars  of international  reserves  between  the  beginning  of the  Plan (February
1986)  and  December  of the  same  year.
So,  towards  the  end  of 1986,  the  macroeconomic  situation  in  Brazil
consisted  of repressed  inflation,  generalized  excess  demand,  and  depleted
international  reserves. In effect,  when the  price  controls  were  abandoned,
inflation  rose  to  monthly  rates  of  between  10 and  15 percent  (December  1986-
March  1987),  which increased  even  more from  April  1987,  reaching  monthly  rates14
of 26 percent  between  May and  June  of that  year.  The  acceleration  of
inflation  led  the  government  to adopt  a  new stabilization  plan,  known  as the
Bresser  Plan (named  after  the  Finance  Minister,  Luis  Bresser  Pereira,  who
replaced  Dilson  Funaro,  initiator  of the  Cruzado  Plan).
The  Bresser  Plan  tried  to  correct  some  of the  errors  of the  Cruzado
Plan,  adjusting  public  fares  and  the  exchange  rates  at the  befinnink  of the
pzice  freeze. This  time  the  freeze  was  to be  just  temporary  and  wage
indexation  mechanisms  were restored  (lagged  with respect  to the  average
inflation  rate  of the  preceding  quarter). The final  outcome  of this  program
was also  unfavorable  with rapidly  rising  inflation  in  the  last  quarter  of 1987
(over  ten  percent  monthly). Brazil  entered  a quasi-hyperinflationary
situation  in 1988,  having  a yearly  inflation  rate  of about  1,000  percent.
Once  again,  controlling  and  reducing  inflation  have  become  the  first  priority
in  any  economic  policy  agenda  in  Brazil.
E.  What do  we learn  from  the  stabilization  experiences?
1.  The  hyperinflations
The  literature  on  hyperinflation  can  be categorized  into  four
approaches:  one  approach  is  associated  with the  simple  quantitative  theory
(Cagan,  1956). It  emphasizes  money  creation  as the 'active 3 source  of
inflation,  exacerbated  by increases  in  money-velocity  in  situations  of  very
high inflation. In this  approach,  a  high  coefficient  of expected  inflation  in
the  demand  for  money  can  generate  explosive  dynamics  of  prices  approaching  a
hyperinflationary  situation.
A  second  approach,  related  to  the  above,  is  a  fiscal  regime  view  of  the
stabilization  of  the  European  Hyperinflations  of  the  209  as  represented  in15
Sargent  (1982). This  author  visualizes  the  success  of these  stabilization
programs  as the  result  of a radical  change  in  the  fiscal  reRime  and  monetary
institutions.  Furthermore,  the  public  sees  these  reforms  as a decisive
correction  of the  main  causes  or 'fundamentals,  of inflation.  Host
importantly,  for  policy  purposes,  this  author  regards  the  monetary  and  fiscal
reforms  as a sufficient  condition  to  achieve  a sudden  stop  of the
hyperinflation,  as observed  in  Central  Europe  in the  twenties.
A third  view,  that  could  be called  the  balance  of payments  approach  to
inflation  (see  a  discussion  of the  approach  in  Bresciani-Turroni,  1937  and
Robinson,  1938),  emphasizes  the  adverse  shocks  on the  Balance  of  Payments
(i.e.,  war reparation  payments  in  the  early  20s  or foreign  debt  services  in
the  80s)  as  basic  causes  of the  exchange  rate  devaluations  and  of inflation.
In this  context,  money  is  passive  in the  sense  that  money  supply  is
adjusted  to the  evolution  of the  exchange  rate  and  prices  in  sustaining  high
activity  levels. In  turn,  the  fiscal  deficit  would  be,  to a great  extent,
endzn4nous  and  related  to inflation  through  the  so-called  Keynes-Olivera-Tanzi
effect. Moreover,  a  distributive  conflict  about  a desired  real  wage forces
the  economy  to undertake  an inflationary  adjustment  of relative  prices  (see
formalization  in  Appendix  I).
This  view  of the  European  hyperinflations  in the  20s  emphasizes  the  need
of  maintaining  an undervalued  real  exchange  rate  able  to generate  a trade
surplus  equivalent  to the  transfers  abroad  (arising  from  the  war reparations
imposed  by the  treaty  of  Versailles  on  Germany  and  the  ex  Austro-Hungarian
empire). In the  presence  of  distributive  conflict,  the  fall  of real  wages
following  a real  devaluation  would  be resisted  through  increases  in  nominal
wages,  and  accommodated  with greater  inflation.  Then,  the  stabilization  was16
successful  when Germany  and  the  other  countries  received  their  war reparation
payments  recycled  through  loans  granted  by the  League  of  Nations  (Taylor,
1987).
A  fourth  approach  is  an eclectic  view  of  hyperinflation  stabilization
(Dornbusch  (1987),  Sachs  (1986). It  emphasizes  the  role  of the  exchange
stabilization  in stopping  hyperinflation  in economies  that  have 'dollarizedt
their  goods  and  asset  markets,  using  the  exchange  rate  as  the  de facto  price
index  of goods  and  services. In this  way, Sachs  (1986)  shows  that,  in  the
Hyperinflationary  Bolivia  of 1985,  the  stabilization  of the  exchange  rate
induced  domestic  inflation  to immediately  converge  towards  international
inflation,  in a  much faster  way than  if the  economy  would  have  relied  only  on
fiscal  reform. Dornbusch  (1987)  points  out  that  the  stabilization  of the
exchange  rate  is like  a certificate  of credibility  in the  stabilization  plan.
In fact,  when real  fiscal  revenues  increase  because  the  stabilization  of the
exchange  rate  reduces  inflation,  the improvement  in  the  fiscal  accounts  by
itself  will increase  the  probability  that  the  program  will succeed.
This  approach  suggests  that  when the  government  stabilizes  prices  and
therefore  eliminates  the  part  of the  fiscal  deficit  that  is  endogenous  to the
inflation  rate,  it should  also  take  measures  to reduce  the  structural  deficit
as a requirement  to guarantee  permanent  price  stability.
The  literature  on the  costs  of stabilizing  a  hyperinflation  has  been
substantially  influenced  by Sargent  (1982). Looking  at the  hyperinflation
stabilizations  of Central  Europe  in  the  20s,  hie  makes  the  case  of
'stabilization  at  lowest  cost'  in  economies  that  have  undertaken  drastic
changes  in  the rules  that  guide  their  fiscal  and  monetary  policies. In
effect,  Sargent  (1982)  suggests  that  the  decisive  change  in the  rules  that17
seemed  to  have  made the  stabilization  credible  and  immediate,  also  saved  the
economies  from  going  through  a period  of  unemployment  and  output  losses,  as
would  have  been  predicted  by Phillips  curve  models  or other  Keynesian  or
structuralist  approaches.
At least  two  remarks  can  be  made  about  Sargent's  approach: on a
theoretical  level,  the  nominal  rigidity  imposed  by the  contract  structure,  a
cause  of  non-neutrality  of  money  and  the  existence  of Phillips  curves  with
negative  slopes,  seemed  to disappear  during  (and  because  of)  the
hyperinflation  before  fiscal  and  monetary  reforms  were taken  up.  This,
obviously,  contributed  to reduce  the  costs  of the  stabilization  plan.
The  situation  is  difterent  in  chronic  and  high  inflations  (but  not
hyperinflations),  in  which  the  existing  contract  structure  shortens  its  terms
but  does  not  disappear. In  these  situations,  it  would  be a lot  more difficult
to  reduce  stabilization  costs,  even  if  the  anti-inflationary  plan  were
completely  credible. This suggests  that  the  costs  of the  stabilization  can  be
related  to the  level  and  variance  of inflation  and  not  only  to the  credibility
of the  stabilization  plan.
At an empirical  level,  recent  studies  (Wicker,  1986)  have  provided  new
evidence  about  the  behavior  of employment  levels  and  the  unemployment  rates  in
the  same  econmoies  analyzed  by Sargent  (1982). Wicker's  study  shows  that  the
stabilization  costs,  in  terms  of employment  losses,  were  not trivial  in  those
economies. In  effect,  the  author  explains  three  concrete  situations  in  which
employment  fell  after  the  stabilizations  i)  a decrease  of employment  in the
banking  sector  that  had over-expanded  during  the  hyperinflation;  ii)  the
reduction  of employment  in the  public  sector,  connected  to  the  fiscal  reform;
and  iii)  the  fall  in  employment  per  unit  of  output  in the  firms  of the18
private  sector  that  were forced  to  be more  efficient  after  the  stabilization.
2.  The  orthodox  stabilization
Persistent  inflation:  One  of the  main  lessons  coming  from  the  orthodox
programs  in the  southern  cone (and  also  from  other  orthodox  experiences,  see
Kiguel  anC  Liviatan,  1988),  refers  to the  sluggishness  of inflation  to react
to  policies  that  reduce  the  rate  of growth  of  nominal  spending. This  feature
of inflationary  inertia  and  credibility  problems  is illustrated  by the  fact
that  even  in economies  that  adopted  drastic  fiscal  adjustment  (i.e.,  Chile  in
the  mid-seventies),  the  inflation  rate  continued  at  high levels  --  over  3
digits  --  for  extended  periods  of time. Inertia  and  credibility  problems  were
severe  enough  that  when  the  exchange  rate  started  to be  used  as the  main
nominal  anchor  in stabilization,  the  inflation  rate  declined  only  moderately
which led  to currency  overvaluation.
The  costs  of stabilization:  The  orthodox  plans  in  the  southern  cone  in  the
seventies  had  an adverse  effect  on real  wages,  (Table  5).  The  combination  of
sharp  devaluations,  the  deregulation  of prices  of  ebsential  products  i.e.,
food  and the  like,  and  the  imposition  of  wage controls  (i.e.,  through  de-
indexation)  explain  these  adverse  effects  on real  wages. The results  of these
plans  dealing  with employment,  unemployment  and  income  distribution  depend  on:
i)  how recessionary  the  stabilization  is ii)  the  content  of the  fiscal  reform
in  terms  of reduction  of real  wages  and/or  employment  in  the  public  sector,
and,  iii)  the  redistribution  of  wealth  that  may  take  place  with the
stabilization.  In this  regard,  Chile  represents  a case  of deterioration  of
those  indicators  in the  initial  phase  of stabilization  (see  Ramos,  1986  and19
Foxsley,  1982).
Exchange  rate-based  stabilization  shoded  that  the  conflicts  between
stabilizing  inflation  and  maintaining  an 'appropriate'  real  exchange  rate
(with  respect  to an  equilibrium  level)  can  be decisive  for  the  success  of a
stabilization  program. In effect,  an overvalued  exchange  rate  can  lead  to a
balance  of  payments  crisis,  so the  stabilization  plan  may  end  up in  a
recession  andlor  in  a resumption  of inflation.  The  Southern  Cone  in the  early
eighties  provided  clear  examples  of  both results  in  practice.
Intertemporal  distribution  of the  adiustment:  The  experience  with
stabilization  shows  that  the  intertemporal  distribution  of the  costs  of
stabilizing  inflation  between  traditional  and  exchange  rate-based  programs  is
different. In the  traditional  plan,  the  costs  are  faced  at the  beginning  of
the  program  when the  economy  is  hit  by the  fiscal  shock. In the  exchange
rate-based  plan the  costs  occur  at  the  end  o. the  plan,  when the  correction  of
unsustainable  current  account  deficits  come  along  with  cuts  in output,
employment  and  real  wages.  -
3.  The  heterodox  e!Derience
The  heterodox  plans  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  achieved  significant  anti-
inflationary  results  in the  short-run  without  incurring  a recession,  even
sustaining  some  growth. However,  they  were unable  to stabilize  inflation  on a
more  permanent  basis. In 1987  and  1988  inflation  sharply  accelerated  in  both
economies  (reaching  Quasi-Hyperinflationary  levels  in  Brazil  during  1988).
Let  us look  at some  lessons  to  be drawn  from  heterodox  stabilization
experiences  in these  two  economies.20
Growth  in spending  and  the  inflation  target: The  Cruzado  Plan  of  1986  clearly
illustrates  that  excessive  growth  in  aggregate  demand  goes  against  meeting  the
targets  on inflation. 11 In fact,  Brazil  attempted  to grow  at  an annual  rate
of 8  percent  and  at the  same  time  have  zero (or  very  low)  inflation;an  event
very  unlikely  to be observed  in  an  economy  with such  a long  inflationary
history. In  Argentina,  by the  second  half  of 1985  after  the  launching  of the
Austral,  the  growth  in spending  was  certainly  more  moderate. Nevertheless,
some  Argentine  economists,  Canavesse  and  Di Tella  (1988)  and  Rodriguez  (1988),
have  questioned  the  degree  to  which  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  was  consistent
with the  objective  of reducing  inflation,  especially  after  April  1986. Given
the  current  inflation  rates  in  Argentina  it  is  hard  to say  that  demand
policies  have  been  over-restrictive.
Price  freezing  and relative  prices: One  of the  risks  in  any  scheme  of price
freezing  is that of producing distorted relative  prices.  This was clear in
Brazil  during  1986  with the  Cruzado  Plan. The  real  exchange  rate  fell  and  at
the  ruling  relative  prices  of basic  and  durable  goods  there  was  excess  demand
for  those  goods,  reflected  by the  emergence  of  black  markets,  queues,  etc..
This  in turn  put  great  pressure  on the  controlled  prices. In  addition,  the
trade  surplus  vanished  in  six  months  mainly  as a  consequence  .,f  a sharp  rise
in imports. Hence  the  combination  of  excess  demand  with  m.saligned  relative
prices  led  to  unsustainable  disequilibria  that  finally  undermined  the
stabilization  effort.21
De-indexation.  The  presence  of indexation  was  viewed  as the  main  element
behind  inertial  inflation  in  those  economies.  As a  key  part  of the
stabilization  plan  indexation  mechanisms  were removed. However,  the  move
proved  to  be barely  recommendable  or effective. In fact,  even  though
indexation  tends  to reduce  the  will to fight  inflation  and  produces
inflationary  inertia,  it  may  also  play  the  role  of a guideline  for  price-
setting  by firms. This  feature  may  be very  useful  in  a  phase  of price  de-
control  after  a period  of freezes. In fact,  indexation  may  contribute  to
avoiding  big  price  jumps  that  could  occur  if  prices  are  severely  misaligned
and  there  is  uncertainty  about  the  new set  of relative  prices  once  the (price)
controls  are  relaxed.
On the  other  hand,  de-indexation  will  hardly  be effective  if the
structure  of wage (or  other)  contracts  exhibits  hysteresis,  in the  sense  that
the  length  of the  contracts  shortens  during  inflationary  accelerations,  but
does  not lengthen  in  periods  of greater  price  stability.  This  lack  of
symmetry  in  the  length  of contracts  undoubtedly  makes  stabilization  more
difficult.
Controlling  the  fiscal  deficits A frequent  explanations  of the  failure  of the
heterodoz  plans  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  to attain  a  more  permanent
stabilization,  ia  their  inabillty  to reduce  the  fiscal  deficit. However,  a
key  question,  rarely  addressed,  is  why it is so  difficult  to  undertake  a
fiscal  reform. One  explanation  is  that  the  price  freezing,  per se,  reduces
the  fiscal  deficit,  because  the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect  disappears.  The  problem
would  be solved  if  the  cut  in inflation  were permanent. However  if  the
reduction  in inflation  is  just  transitory,  policy-makers  may  wrongly  interpret22
a cyclical  fiscal  adjustment  as  a structural  improvement  of the  government
budget.
On the  other  hand,  a structural  adjustment  of the  fiscal  deficit
involves  economic  and  political  costs  that  only  a few  governments  are  willing
to (or  can)  face,  especially  in short  periods. This  is  especially  so  during
economic  crises  like  the  ones  that  have  been  accompanying  the  implementation
of the  heterodox  programs  in  Latin  America  during  the  eighties. The  natural
tendency  then  would  be to  postpone  the  fiscal  adjustment,  waiting  for  a more
favorable  macroeconomic  environment.
The foreign  exchange  constraint:  Our  previous  discussion  of the  stabilization
of European  hyperinflations  in  the  twenties  emphasized  the  role  played  by the
availability  of foreign  currency  in the  success  of those  stabilization  plans.
An evident  parallel  can  be  made  with the  Argentine  and  Brazilian
experiences  in the  eighties: The  balance  of  payments  of  both  economies  has
been  very  vulnerable,  mainly  due  to foreign  debt  service  problems  they  have
_aced. This  situation  is destabilizing  since  it  makes  it  particularly  risky
to use  the  exchange  rate  for  anti-inflationary  purposes. Exchange  rate
adjustments  may send  inflation  to a  higher  plateau  when there  is  widespread
indexation  in  the  economy.
A reference  to  the  Israeli  stabilization  plan  is  useful  at this  point.
Among  the  heterodox  programs  so far,  Israel  stands  out  as  a more  successful
case.  Its  capability  of eliminating  the  fiscal  deficit  explains,  to some
extent,  Israel's  outstanding  performance.  Nevertheless,  we must  note  that
during  the  stabilization  plan,  Israel  received  a net  transfer  of resources
from  abroad  (through  foreign  assistance  and  others). Thus  Israel  has  been23
able  to run  trade  deficits. In contrast,  in  Argentina  and  Brazil,  the
resource  transfer  has  been  made to foreign  countries  and  therefore  they  were
forced  to run  trade  surpluses  and  to undervalue  the  real  exchange  rate. As  we
already  mentioned,  such  a transfer  can  be inflationary  and  works  against
stabilization.
Distributive  conflict  and  the  political  cycles Although  the  heterodox
programs  were  not explicitly  conceived  as redistributive  plans,  the
distributive  conflict  has  been  present. The  environment  has  been  one  of  a
foreign  constraint  and  undervalued  real  exchange  rates  (compared  to a
situation  with  more availability  of foreign  resources).  Again,  this  may  be
inflationary  because  labor  may resist  the  fall  in real  wages  and  try  to
conserve  its  share  of  national  income. The result  of this  can  be an increase
in inflation,  if  monetary  policy  is  accommodating.  This  might  be reinforced
by the  fact  that  the  heterodox  programs  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  were
undertyken  by democratic  governments  preceded  by authoritarian  experiences
that  had  weakened  the  bargaining  power  of labor.
The  political  cycle  in  some  respects  contributed  to,  and  in other
respects  harmed  the  stabilization  process. As noted  by  Dornbusch  and  Simonsen
(1987),  both  the  heterodox  plans  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  initially  had strong
political  support  by the  population.  However,  this  political  base  of support
started  to  be eroded  as the  initial  success  was followed  by a resumption  of
inflation.
The  political  cycle  also  hampered  the  stabilization  effort  by
encouraging  over-expansionary  policies,  aimed  at increasii.6  public  support  for
the  government,  at times  of  upcoming  elections. The  clearest  example  of this24
was the  expansionary  cycle  experienced  by the  Brazilian  economy  before  the
parliamentary  elections  in November  of 1986,  at a time  when the  Cruzado  Plan
was  underway.
F.  Final Remarks
Three  types  of  anti-inflationary  experiences  have  been  examined  in
focusing  the  discussion  on the  costs  of stabilization  and  the  lessons  to be
drawn  from  each  case.
The  notion  that  the  stabilization  of a  hyperinflation  has  low (absolute)
costs  in terms  of employment  and  real  wages,  is  not fully  endorsed  either  by
the  European  experiences  of the  twenties  or by the  Bolivian  case in  the  mid-
eighties  as shown  by recent  empirical  evidence. However  it seems  to be the
case that  stabilizing  a  Hyperinflation  still  has  lower  economic  costs  than
stabilizing  chronic,  intermediate  inflation.  Furthermore,  a  discussion  of
four  approaches: the  quantitative  theory,  the  fiscal  regime  view,  the  balance
of payments  theory  and  the  eclectic  approach  was done  in  order  to shed  some
light  on the  causes  and  cures  of these  hyperinflationary  episodes.
The  orthodox  experiences  in the 'outhern  Cone  in the  seventies  show  that
stabilization  programs  focusing  only  on restrictive  monetary  and  fiscal  policy
can  be slow  in  producing  anti-inflationary  results. They  may  also  entail
considerable  costs  in terms  of activity  levels  and  real  wages. Orthodox
programs  based  on exchange  rate  management  were able  to reduce  inflation  more
rapidly  than  traditional  programs,  but  led  to  overvalued  real  exchange  rates
and  the  accumulation  of foreign  debt.  The  correction  of these  disequilibria
proved  that  the  stabilization  costs  were  not  eliminated  by those  programs  but
were only  delayed  towards  the  end  of the  anti-inflationary  program.25
It is interesting  to  note  that  the  intertemporal  distribution  of the
costs  of stabilization,  related  to  programs  that  rely  mainly  on one  nominal
anchor,  such  as the  exchange  rate,  is  also  valid  in  heterodox  plans  that  use
several  nominal  anchors  to stabilize.
The  heterodox  stabilization  programs  were able  to achieve  significant
anti-inflationary  gaina  in the  short-run,  without  recession  and  even  with
(moderate)  growth. Nevertheless,  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  these  anti-
inflationary  gains  were temporary  and  were followed  by significant
inflationary  accelerations  in  1987  and  1988. The  explanations  behind  those
results  are  multiple  and  are  connected  to the  difficulties  of controlling
aggregate  demand  and  the  fiscal  deficit,  the  behavior  of relative  price  during
the  stabilization,  the  existence  of a foreign  constraint  with important  net
resource  transfers  abroad,  the  inertia  of the  contract  structure  in the
economy,  and  the  influence  of the  distributive  conflict  and  the  political
cycle. Finally,  it is  worth  mentioning  Israel. This  country  has  been  able  to
stabilize  inflation  more permanently  through  a  heterodox  program  that
succeeded  in the  fiscal  adjustment  and  benefited  from  a net  resource  transfer
from  abroad. In  this  regard,  it stand-up  as  the  successful  case  in the
heterodox  field.
A final  and  important  issue  concerns  the  appropriate  policies  to  use in
different  inflationary  situations.  It is  hard  to  make  valid  generalizations
on this  issue  but  some  principles  are  apparent. In general,  a stabilization
plan that  relies  only  on reducing  money  growth  and  doing  fiscal  adjustment  has
more  chance  to succeed  in reducing  inflation  in the  short  run  in situations  of
temporary  inflation.  However,  in  countries  with  a long  inflationary  history
and  well developed  indexation  mechanisms,  inflation  will  be Osti:ky".26
Therefore  exclusive  reliance  on restrictive  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  may
be a costly  and  probably  ineffective  way to  cut  inflation  in the  short  and
medium  run.
The  use  of income  policies  combined  with  demand  management  policies  may
become  an effective  tool  to reduce  inflation  in  the  short  run  without  forcing
the  economy  to go through  a recessionary  period. However,  the  achievement  of
a  permanent  reduction  in inflation  requires  nominal  spending  to grow  at rates
compatible  with price  stability  in  the  medium  and  long  run.
The stabilization  of  Hyperinflation  provides  a case  of rapid
disinflation  with restrictive  monetary  and  fiscal  policies;  but the
stabilization  of the  exchange  rate  also  proved  to  be a key  component  for  the
success  of those  stabilization  packages. Finally,  the  history  of economic
stabilization  has  amply  shown  that  the  availability  of adequate  foreign
financing  has  been  an important  complement  to the  success  of different
stabilization  plans.27
1.  In the twentieth  century,  hyperinflationary  phenomena  have occurred  in
Europe  in  the  20s,  specifically  in  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary,  and  Poland. Also
in  China  and  Greece  in  the  408.  Two  of  the  most  recent  examples  of  hyperinflation
are  the  Bolivian  case  in 1984-85,  and  Nicaragua  in  1988.
2.  See Dornbusch  and Fisher,  1986;  Dornbusch,  1985;  CEPAL,  1986;  Sargent,
1982.
3.  In effect, in the early 80s, Bolivia lost its access  to private  and
multilateral  international  loan  sources  (World  Bank,  IDB,  IMF),  Bolivia  responded
to that  by suspending  the  servicing  of its  foreign  debt.  For  fiscal  purposes,
the  government(s)  replaced  the  foreign  loans  to the  public  sector  by loans  from
the  Central  Bank  as a source  of financing  their  expenditure.
4.  See  Sachs  (1987)  and  the  econometric  evidence  on  this  subject  for  Bolivia
in Sachs  (1986).
5.  The fiscal  reform  in Bolivia  included  a sharp  increase  in the taxes  on
fuel,  decreases  in  the  employment  in  public  administration  and  state  mines,  and
a  wage freeze  for  public  officials.
6.  The open economy  version  of the orthodox  approach  (like  the monetary
approach  of Balance  of  Payments),  gives  an active  role  to the  exchange  rate  in
the anti-inflationary  stabilization  process,  since it assumes  that domestic
prices  are determined  by foreign  prices,  expressed  in domestic  currency. So,
correcting  the  fiscal  deficit  is  an essential  prior  condition  to the  guarantee
of  a level  of international  reserves,  consistent  with the  fixed  exchange  rate.
7.  Another  noteworthy  aspect  is  that  the  relation  between  the  fiscal  deficit
and  inflation  differs  substantially  among  these  three  countries. For  example,
in  1983,  a fiscal  deficit  of 4Z  of the  GDP in  Chile  and  Uruguay  was  associated
with an inflation  rate  of 27.3Z  in  the  former  country  and  51.5Z  in the  latter.
This  variability  in the relation  between  fiscal  deficit  and  inflation  is also
observed  within  the  different  sub-periods  analyzed  in  each  country.
8.  Nevertheless,  in 1975,  Chile  and  Uruguay  also faced  a deterioration  in
their  terms  of trade.
9.  The distributive  phenomenon  in the Southern  Cone is further  studied  in
Ramos  (1986)  and  Foxley  (1982).
10.  See  Frenkel  et al,  1986,  Machinea  and  Fanelli,  1988.
11.  Analytically,  a decrease  in  the  inflation  rate  has  an  ambiguous  effect  on
aggregate  demand.  There  are  at least  three  effects  that  operate  in opposite
directions.  i)  The real interest  rates  may rise if inflation  slows  down
unexpectedly.  ii) The  purchasing  power  of  wages  and  other  income  will  rise  when
the inflation  rate falls.  iii)  The real fiscal  revenue  increases  wnen the
inflation  rate  decreases  because  of the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect. Effects  i) and
iii)  are  contractive  and  ii)  is  expansive. See  Taylor  (1987).28
A.1
APPENDIX
The  Balance  of Payments  Approach  to  Inflation:  A Formalization
As  we have sEen  in  this  paper,  in the  analysis  of  hyperinflations  in
Central  Europe  in the  20s,  a popular  approach  was one  that  attributed  the
cause  of inflation  to  adverse  shocks  in  the  Balance  of Payments. This
appendix  presents  a simple  model  that  seeks  to  capture  the  basic  elements  of
this  approach,  still  relevant  today. In  this  setting,  inflation  results  from
the  combination  of 3 elements: i)  The  existence  of a fixed,  desired  real
wage in  the  economy  (which  reflects  the  existence  of a distributive  conflict);
ii)  The  need  to  modify  the  real  exchange  rate  to resttre  balance  of  payments
equilibrium  when there  is a  new set  of external  parameters;  iii)  The
existence  of a  passive  or accommodative  monetary  policy.
To formalize  these  arguments,  let  us start  with a real  target  wage.
Wt
- -o  (1)
Pt_1
Where  Wt is the  nominal  wage at time  t, Pt_l  is  the  price  level  at t-l
and  0  is  a constant,  representing  desired  real  wages  by the  workers.
Taking  logs  on both  sides  of equation  (1),  and  using  lowercase  letters
to denote  logs,  then  equation  (1),  can  be written  as:
Wt  - Pt-l '  (2)
where  wt  - log  Wt  Pt-l  - log  Pt_l  and i  - log  0.29
Adding  and  subtracting  Pt (=logPt)  on  both  sides  of (2),  we get:
Wt - Pt  +  Pt  Pt-i  P  (3)
wR  +  X
where wR  (=wt - Pt) is the (log)  of the real wage and ft(=Pt - Pt-i)  is the
rate  of inflation.
From  Equation  (3).  we can  write  the  actual  real  wage,  wR,  as the
difference  between  the  target  (or  desired)  log  of the  real  wage,  p. and  the
ongoing  rate  of inflation,  1.
wR  '  - Jr  (4)
It is  clear  from  (4),  that  the  only  way to  modify  actual  real  wages,  given  an
unchanged  desired  real  wage is  accelerating  or decelerating  the  rate  of
inflation.
The  next  question  is  why a change  in real  wages  might  be required and
how this  is related  to shocks  associated  with the  balance  of payments.
Let  us define,  now,  the  real  exchange  rate  ER.  as the  ratio  of the
nominal  exchange  rate,  e, (foreign  prices  are  set  at  unity)  and  the  level  of
nominal  wages,  W.
ER3  - E  (5)
W
taking  logs,  yields
eR ' e - v  (6)
where  eR  - log ER  , e - log  E,  w  - log  W
Now,  a  vector  Z can  be defined,  composed  by {ZI,  Z2,...)  elements,  each
of them  corresponding  to  external  variables  like  the  terms  of trade,  the  level
of the  foreign  real  interest  rate,  the  availability  of foreign  financing  and30
so on.
Then,  denoting  the  balance  of payments  as B (.)  and  making  it  a function
of the  real  exchange  rate,  eR,  and  the  vector  of parameters,  Z.
B (er°, ZO) a  0  (7)
Then  B (*)  - 0 represents  equilibrium  in the  balance  of payments,  for
given  values  of eR and  Z.  A relationship  between  current  real  wages  and  the
real  exchange  rate  can  be obtained  from  a Cobb-Douglas  price  equation  like
(8).
P - WI  El-a  (8)
where  a  and 1-a  are  the  shares  of  wages  and  imported  intermediate
goods  in  unitary  costs  (foreign  prices  of imported  intermediate  goods  are set
at unity).
Writing  equation  (8)  in logarithmic  form,  yields
p  - a  w  +  (1  - a )  e  (9)
Subtracting  w on both  si.es  of (9)  and  rearranging  terms  we obtain:
C  - p  -(l  -a)  (e  - w)  (10)
or
YR  - (1-a)  eR  (10)
That is,  from (10)  appears  a  negative  relationship  between  the  real
exchange  rate  and  the  level  of real  wages.
Now, let  us assume  the  economy  is  hit  by adverse  foreign  shocks  like  a
deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  or a cut  in  foreign  financing,  so  that  now
for  Z  - Zl (a  new  vector  of {Zll, Z2
1,...}),  the  restoration  of  balance  of
payments  equilibrium  requires  a  higher  real  exchange  rate,  say
1  eR  = eR  >  er  , so  that
B (elR  ,  Z1)  - 0  (11)31
From  our  relationship  between  the  real  exchange  rate  and  actual  real
wages,  (equation  (10),  it is  clear  that  restoring  balance  of payments
equilibrium  requires  a reduction  in  actual  real  wages
wlR  - -(1-a) eIR  (12)
where  wlR<  wR0 (consistetit  with eR 0)
A  relationship  between  the  rate  of inflation  and  the  level  of the  real
exchange  rate  can  be obtained  by combining  equation  (4)  with (10).
i  - + (1  - a)  eR  (13)
Equation  (13)  says  that  a  higher  real  exchange  rate  is  associated  with a
higher  rate  of inflation  for  a given  level  of the  target  real  wage.  Clearly,
the  adjustment  in relative  prices  (the  real  exchange  rate)  associated  to
adverse  foreign  shocks  produces  an acceleration  in inflation,  the  basic
contention  of the  b'.lance  of payments  school. A  graphic  representation  could
help to illustrate  this  point.
The  vertical  schedule  B B in  Table  5, represents  the  balance  of  payments
equation B(eR ,  Z)  - 0,  drawn  for  a given  vector  Z.
The  upward-sloping  schedule  VV represents  the  equation
-- p  +  (1-a)  eR
Schedule  VV is drawn  assuming  a given  target  real  wage  p.  The
equilibrium  rate  of inflation  and  the  exchange  rate  are  represented  by  Il





eR,°  eR'  eR
In this  setting,  an adverse  real  shock  affecting  the  balance  of payments
will shift  the  BB schedule  to  the  right,  thus  increasing  the  equilibrium  rate
of  inflation  and  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate.
In summary,  for  a  balance  of payments "crisis"  to  be associated  with  an
acceleration  in inflation  two  conditions  have to  be  met:  the  desired  real
wage  has to remain  constant  or at least  'sticky'  in  face  of adverse  real
shocks  to the  balance  of payments  and  second,  monetary  policy  must  be
accommodating  in  order  to  check  price  increases  associated  with  exchange  rate
depreciation.33
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EUROPEAN  HYPERINFLATIONS IN  THE 20s:  INDICATORS OF THE  LABOR  MARKET  AND PRODUCTION
Germany  Austria
Index of  Real Wages  No. of unemployed
physical  Skilled  Unskilled Unemployment  Rate  people (receiving)
production  workers  workers  (Z)  subsidies)
per capita  (1913-100)
1920  61.0  August 1922  72.0  93.4  September 1923  9.9  1922
1921  77.0  October 1923  53.0  64.6  November 1923  23.4  January  17 000
April  42 000
1922  86.0  December 1923  70.0  85.2  January 1924  26.5  c
July  33  000
1923  54.0  June 1924  89.24  98.4  April 1924  10.4  October  38 000
1924  77.0  October 1924  8.4  1923
1925  90.0  January  117 000
April  153 000
1926  86.0  July  93 000
October  79 000
1927  111.0
1924
January  98  000
April  107 000
July  64  000
October  78  000
Source:  Sargent (1983),  Dornbusch  and Fischer (1986)TAELE 3
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TABLE  6
SOUTHERN  CONE:  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION,
1973-1983
Chile  Uruguay  Argentina
Index  a/  Index  Index
1970  100.0  100.0  100.0
1973  84,1  84.2  84.1
1978  77.5  62.3  64.2
1981  92.6  65.7  73.2
1983  97.1  56.1  90.8
Sourcet J.  Ramos  (1980),  based  on  data  of  ECLA.
a/  Index  -treal wage)  X  EmploYment  ) aI  Inex  a(rea  wag)  ~  Gross  disposable  income)
i.e.,  the index  reflects  the  evolution  of the  labor  share  in  national
income  (greater  than  100  means  improvement,  lower  than  100  means
deterioration).TABLE  7
ARGENTINA:  MUSTRAL  PLAN
Real Interest  Idustrial  Open  Urban  Term of
Inf  laten  Rat*;  Real  Output  Eipleymet  trade
Rate,  CPI  ml  ex  post a/  Wges  (Percentaoe  Rate  (variation
()  (  of  COP)  (50  dar.)  (19GU100)bl  ae  )  (5)  ratell)
19l5  1994  4.7  1964  124.9  0.7  1964  3.6  1964  21.0
Janury  25.1  I  5.1  I  125.2  1.2  1965  5.1  1965  -17.6
February  20.7  II  4.9  II  128.9  *.5
Ueueh  20.1  III  4.6  III  121.6  -0.4  1966  4.0  1966  -15.0
Ap411  29.5  IV  4.1  IV  121.0  -3.7
lly  23.1  1967  5.4  1967  3.4
ue  s0.  1s5  5.0  1.16  1065  112.2  -0.9
July  6.2  -
August  2.1  I  *.7  -1.1  I  117.9  -5.6
5ete_er  2.0  1I  5.S  -1.45  II  103.7  -4.1
October  1.0  III  5.7  4.2  III  112.8  4.6
_suwer  2.4  IV  . 7.1  .1  ITV  114.5  13.1
December  5.2
1M  1_66  6.1  0.32  1906  2.3
J_  ry  2.0  I  *.1  2.8  I  122.3  4.5
Februry  1.7  II  0.1  -0.5  II  119.6  0.5
Horeb  4.6  Ill  6.2  -1.2  III  120.1  7.1








1667  1967  167
January  7.0  I  3.1  0.7  I  120.5  -2.2
Februay  6.5  II  0.1  0.6  II  114.3
KeItb  9.2  III  3.1  III  111.5









Source:  R. Freniel;  V. Doi  i  (1987);  ECLA  (1967)
o/  Free Market leding  rote
b/  Avrage  nominal na- in  the  industrial  *ector  in  t-1.  deflated  by the CPI in  period  t.FICUE 9
BRAZIL:  THE CRUZADO  PLAN
Fiscal  Def  ticlt  Trade
(h  OGN)  InflItion  Rate  (X)  Balance  Ratio  of
----- _-  --------------------  (FOB  eIlliIon*  exchango  rate/  Industrial  Index of
No"miaI  Oprutieol  Asanal  Monthly  of  us 68)  was"  Renl  Wages  Industrial  Output
Monthly  (January  1967=100)  (January  1967=100)  (1961=100)
1904-0  - 49.7  1965
1961  - 102.1  (uothly
avorage)  9.4  1 040.5  131.6  104.0  107.6
1962  - 92.9
1994
1983  19.9  3.0  161.9  --
January  14.1  701.0  110.2  102.1  109.03
1964  21.6  1.6  210.5  February  10.9  020.0  122.5  102.4  102.50
March  1.0  1  137.0  117.4  111.7  104.86
1965  26.2  4.3  234.8  April  2.3  1 292.0  115.1  111.3  109.36
May  1.9  1 340.0  112.9  111.4  114.33
19  6  10.0  3.7  142.4  June  0.9  1 071.0  113.6  109.7  121.16
July  1.1  1 010.0  110.7  111.2  131.64
1967  5.5  224.6  August  1.9  960.0  106.3  111.6  130.72
Septembr  1.4  544.0  107.0  111.6  137.63
October  3.1  -79.0  104.7  111.6  143.06
Novemer  4.4  -32.0  99.6  113.4  126.20
December  10.3  -21;.0  96.0  106.0  113.9
1967
January  13.6  129.0  100.0  100.0  116.77
February  11.3  302.0  10.3  90.9  116.66
March  12.0  206.0  96.1  109.1
April  10.6  620.0  96.0  106.7
Mby  26.5  9Oi.0  102.4  104.4
June  26.6
July  9.2
Source:  Solimno  (1967),  ConJunturn  Economics (1967,1998)PPR  Workine  Pat,er Series
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